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Abstract 
This paper assesses the role of financial performance in explaining firms’ investment dynamics 
in the wine industry from the three European Union (EU) largest producers. The wine sector 
deserves special attention to investigate firms’ investment behavior given the high competition 
imposed by the latecomers.  More precisely, we investigate how the capitalization, liquidity and 
profitability influence the investment dynamics using firm-level data from the wine industry 
from France (331 firms), Italy (335) firms and Spain (442) firms. We use data from 2007 to 
2014, drawing a comparison between these countries, and relying on difference- and system-
GMM estimators. Specifically, the impact of profitability is positive and significant, while the 
capitalization has a significant and negative impact on the investment dynamics only in France 
and Spain. The influence of the liquidity ratio is negative and significant only in the case of 
Spain. Therefore, we notice different investment strategies for wine companies located in the 
largest producer countries. It appears that these findings are in general robust to different 
specifications of liquidity and profitability ratios, and to the different estimators we use.  
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the key challenges the wine economics and corporate finance literature has to cope 
with is the identification of determinants of firms’ investment behavior. Understanding the 
factors influencing firms’ investment is important both from the point of view of business cycle 
fluctuations, and from the perspective of financial management optimization and investors’ 
wealth. For this purpose, prior literature investigates the role of a large set of external and 
internal determinants, and reports mixed empirical evidence. However, the interest for studding 
the investment behavior of wine companies is scarce. This paper fills in this gap and adds to 
the menu of studies addressing the role of internal factors in supporting the firms’ investment 
behavior, by focusing on the role of financial performance and using wine industry firm-level 
data from the largest wine producing countries, namely France, Italy and Spain. We posit that 
the investment behavior of the wine companies located in these countries is not only influenced 
by the economic context and competition policies (Rizzo, 2019), but also by their financial 
performances. 
The external determinants of firms’ investment behavior are related to business cycle 
(Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Jeon and Nishihara, 2014; Pérez-Orive, 2016), taxation (Hall and 
Jorgenson 1967; Morck, 2003; Jugurnath et al., 2008), monetary policy (Vithessonthi et al., 
2017), quality of institutions (Ajide, 2017), and even to the behavior of other firms from the 
same industry (Lyandres, 2006; Leary and Roberts, 2014; Park et al., 2017). Noteworthy studies 
(e.g. Abel 1983; Bernanke 1983; Hartman 1972; Pindyck 1988; Calcagnini and Iacobucci 1997; 
Baum et al., 2008; Glover and Levine, 2015) investigate the controversial role of uncertainty in 
influencing firms’ investment behavior.1   
Two main categories of internal factors explain firms’ investment behavior.2 On the one 
hand, building upon Modigliani and Miller (1958), the literature underlines the role of financial 
constraints, leverage and cash flow (Fazzari et al., 1988; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Lang 
et al., 1996; Chen et al., 2001; Suto, 2003; Aivazian et al., 2005;  Ahn et al., 2006; Baum et al., 
2010; Almeida et al., 2011; Maçãs Nunes et al., 2012; Colombo et al., 2013; Vermoesen et al., 
2013; Ameer, 2014). On the other hand, agency costs, information asymmetry and ownership 
structure are put forward (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Koo and Maeng, 2006; Danielson and 
 
1 Uncertainty is in general associated with the lack of forecast accuracy (Albulescu et al., 2017). A recent paper 
by Chen et al. (2017) shows that the quality of analysts’ forecasts significantly increases the efficiency of firms’ 
investment. 
2 A distinct category of internal factors explaining firms ‘investment behavior might be related to the technological 
capabilities (for a discussion, please see the recent paper by Kang et al., 2017).  
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Scott, 2007; Alex, et al., 2013; Farla, 2014; Mavruk and Carlsson, 2015). Several papers (e.g. 
Shen and Wang, 2005) show that both financial constraints and ownership structure influence 
the investment decision, while other papers (e.g. Bokpin and Onumah, 2009) underline the role 
of firms’ size in explaining the investment behavior. 
The financial constraints and firms’ leverage have important implications on the 
investment behavior (Suto, 2003; Ahn et al., 2006), influencing at the same time the structure 
of investment (Almeida et al., 2011). A series of studies shows that financial constraints have 
a negative impact on firm-level investment. In this line, Vermoesen et al. (2013) report that 
high leveraged Belgian firms experienced a larger investment contraction during crisis times, 
as compared to less leveraged firms. Opposite findings are reported by Baum et al. (2010) for 
a set of manufacturing United States (US) firms, who show that leverage stimulates the 
investment under the effects of uncertainty. However, most of existing empirical works focus 
on the role of financial constraints in explaining the investment – cash flow sensitivities. The 
financial friction theory mentions that the impact of cash flow on investment increases in the 
presence of credit constraints. While Aidogan (2003) shows that the sensitivity of firm’s 
investment to its own cash flow increases for growing firms, Kim (2014) states that the 
investment – cash flow sensitivity is explained by the level of external financing. Using a Panel 
Smooth Transition Regression model for 519 Asian listed firms over the period 1991-2004, 
Ameer (2014) reports that investment – cash flow sensitivity varies across different categories 
of firms. Mulier et al. (2016) also point out that the highest investment – cash flow sensitivity 
characterizes financially constrained firms. Another set of works (e.g. Gamba and Triantis 
2008; Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2014) underlines the role of financial flexibility in fostering firm-
level investment. Using a sample of 1,068 Asian firms, Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014) report that 
financial flexibility achieved through conservative leverage policies has significant influence 
on investment, in particular in crisis periods.  
The second strand of literature investigates the role of agency costs, information 
asymmetry and ownership structure in influencing the investment behavior. In their pioneering 
paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that agency conflicts might distort firms’ investment 
decision in the presence of multiple owners. Performing an empirical investigation for a panel 
of 115 listed firms in Taiwan for the period 1991-1997, Shen and Wang (2005) highlight that 
investment behavior is financially constrained in a cross-ownership system. At the same time, 
Koo and Maeng (2006) find that the presence of foreign ownership in Korean firms decreases 
the investment – cash flow sensitivity. More recently, Farla (2014) discovers that firms’ 
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investment behavior has little dependency on a country’s macroeconomic setting, while 
foreign-owned firms have lower investment dynamics.  
Only few papers, however, focus on the role of profitability and liquidity on the 
investment behavior (e.g. Perić and Đurkin, 2015; Yu et al., 2017). While some studies (e.g. 
Stickney and McGee, 1982; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Black et al. 2000) use financial 
performance indicators as control variables in their empirical specifications, several papers put 
accent on the role of liquidity in influencing the investment behavior. As Baum et al. (2008) 
show, the impact of liquidity on investment is not straightforward. While in crisis periods 
characterized by credit contractions and financial frictions it is expected that liquidity positively 
influence the investment decision, an opposite effect appears if investment projects are delayed. 
On the one side, Acharya et al. (2007) state that the liquidity level sustains firms’ future 
investment and offers protection against market risks. On the other side, Hirth and Viswanatha 
(2011) find that in the case of financially constrained firms, the relationship between liquidity 
and investment is U-shaped.  
We extend the existing literature by examining not only the role of liquidity, but also the 
impact of capitalization and profitability on investment behavior. All these variables 
characterize the firms’ financial performance, offering at the same time information about risk 
protection and incentive to develop the business. The level of cash holdings and thus the level 
of liquidity is considered the cheapest cost of investment. Therefore, for a specific period, if 
firms decide to increase their liquidity for risk protection reasons (i.e. during crisis periods), a 
trade-off is expected between liquidity and investment. The increase of capitalization level 
might also be done in the detriment of investment. It is surprising that previous literature does 
not debate the role of capitalization in the investment behavior. However, the level of 
capitalization provides, on the one hand, information about the debt level and, on the other 
hand, information about the way shareholders interact with managers in the investment 
decision. When investment becomes risky, shareholders might prefer to increase capitalization. 
At the same time, shareholders’ equity represents an investment resource. In this context, during 
a fiscal year, it is expected that an increase in capitalization negatively influence the investment 
dynamics. Finally, the level of profitability positively affects the investment behavior. First, 
profitability increases the level of internal funds available for investment and has a negative 
influence on leverage (Datta and Agarwal, 2014). Second, high profits provide information 
about market dynamics and recommend future investments.  
Another contribution of this paper to the bulk of literature investigating the determinants 
of firm-level investment consist in the empirical approach we use. Investment dynamics affects 
5 
 
in its turn firms’ financial performance (Gatchev et al., 2009). Therefore, in line with other 
studies, we address the endogeneity issues resorting to a Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) panel approach. Nevertheless, different form previous works, we address different 
econometric issues as residual autocorrelation or instruments’ over-identification, which may 
introduce a bias in the reported results, if the models are not correctly specified. Comparing a 
difference-GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and a system-GMM estimator (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998), we show that the results are sensitive to different econometric specifications, 
although they are robust to alternative measures of liquidity and profitability.  
Finally, we investigate the role of financial performance on the investment behavior using 
wine industry firm-level data from France, Italy and Spain, the largest European Union (EU) 
and worldwide producers. As far as we know, the study by Outreville and Hanni (2013) is the 
only one addressing the determinants of investment in the wine industry. However, the authors 
focus on the foreign investment, investigating the case of the largest multinational enterprises, 
and underline the role of location for the inward investment. Different from this work, we 
analyze the case of domestic and foreign firms acting in the wine industry from the largest 
producing countries. France and Italy dominated the international wine market before the 1980s 
(Morrison and Rabellotti, 2017). Spain recorded a considerable development of the wine 
industry since then. Therefore, even after the increasing importance of newcomers in the 
industry (i.e. US, Chile, South Africa or Australia), the three EU countries continued to 
dominate the wine industry at global level.3 Has the financial performance of firms located in 
these countries a similar impact on their investment behavior in the context of an increased 
competition on the wine market? We try to respond to this question analyzing firm-level data 
for 331 firms located in France, 335 firms located in Italy and 442 firms from Spain, over the 
period 2007 to 2014. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some general statistics 
about the wine industry, with a focus on the EU. Section 3 describes the data and the 
methodology. Section 4 highlights the empirical results and presents the robustness checks. In 
Section 5 we present the summary of results and discuss in a comparative manner the role of 
financial performance on firms’ investment behavior in the three analyzed countries, generating 
policy recommendations. The last section concludes. 
 
 
 
3 The EU countries does not only represent the largest wine exporters. For example, the United Kingdom counts 
between the largest wine importers (Anderson and Wittwer, 2017). 
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2. General statistics about the wine industry in the selected EU countries 
 
During the last decades, in the context of new EU regulations, wine-producing regions of 
Europe struggled to adapt to changing market conditions and to fight against the competition 
of newcomers in this industry (Outreville and Hanni, 2013). Table 1 indicates that France, Italy 
and Spain together represented more than 55% from the total wine production, and more than 
25% of total wine exports during the 1960s. However, the total production of these countries 
dropped to 45% out of the world production during the 2010s, while the total exports represent 
nowadays more than 50%. These figures show that world-level production and consumption 
increased with the newcomers on the wine market, but the consecrated producers became more 
and more competitive. This happened in the context of an intensive process of international 
acquisitions, driven by competitive prices and the opportunity to acquire key brands (Anderson 
et al., 2003). Given that wine is considered a typical cultural commodity, these producers 
readapted their market strategy, underlining the intangible characteristics of their product (e.g. 
the notion of ‘terroir’ in France). Nevertheless, while Italy and Spain continued to increase their 
quotas in the world exports, France encountered a severe contraction during the last decade.  
Table 1. Wine production and exports (% world total volumes) 
 1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Wine production 
FR 22.59% 24.97% 19.79% 22.98% 20.32% 17.80% 15.69% 17.47% 16.77% 18.69% 16.17% 14.67% 
IT 24.42% 22.81% 24.57% 19.24% 19.10% 15.47% 16.15% 16.22% 16.54% 14.87% 14.70% 15.39% 
SP 9.39% 8.48% 12.03% 13.92% 14.54% 13.30% 13.73% 12.14% 13.36% 12.33% 11.95% 15.75% 
Wine exports 
FR 14.72% 11.26% 19.58% 28.19% 22.07% 16.34% 15.17% 13.66% 14.12% 14.30% 14.87% 14.52% 
IT 6.87% 15.25% 33.49% 29.55% 23.20% 21.12% 20.91% 22.79% 23.26% 23.70% 21.08% 20.31% 
SP 5.48% 9.03% 12.22% 10.80% 12.01% 16.32% 17.66% 16.98% 18.37% 21.81% 20.31% 17.96% 
Note: France (FR), Italy (IT), Spain (SP). 
Source: Faostat database 
 
As compared to other EU countries, France, Italy and Spain are considered by far the 
largest producers, representing according to the Eurostat statistics, more than 80% of the total 
wine production in the EU. Table 2 presents the dynamics of the wine industry in terms of 
opening stocks in the selected EU countries. 
Table 2. Opening stocks by vintage year in the EU countries (1,000 Hl) 
 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 
FR 57,062 57,459 53,901 54,061 54,518 59,958 53,238 47,830 50,318 51,514 
IT 41,120 41,719 44,746 41,360 41,502 40,632 36,500 45,250 41,276 42,692 
SP 33,817 34,168 36,962 36,446 34,169 28,677 29,311 36,619 33,730 30,701 
EU-28 165,624 167,871 174,182 170,454 164,921 160,483 150,868 164,249 162,908 163,586 
Note: France (FR), Italy (IT), Spain (SP), European Union with 28 member states (EU-28). 
Source: Eurostat database 
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3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. Data 
We use firm-level annual data from AMADEUS database to investigate the impact of 
firms’ financial performance on the investment dynamics over the period 2007 to 2014. To 
avoid the broken panel bias, we have included in our analysis only firms without missing values 
for a specific indicator. Further, we have dropped from our sample those companies where data 
indicate a capitalization ratio (capital to total assets) over 100%. Finally, our sample includes 
331 firms out of 367 firms registered in France (90%), 335 firms out of 410 recorded in Italy 
(82%), and 442 firms out of 531 registered in Spain (83%). The focus on firms with complete 
data only may introduce a sample bias, because firms with specific characteristics are more 
likely to enter in our sample. However, in our case, this bias is marginal given the high 
percentage of retained companies from each country. Moreover, as Andrén and Jankensgård 
(2015) state, balancing the panel has an important benefit as it allows the possibility to perform 
different robustness checks.  
The investment dynamics (inv) is calculated as the growth rate of fixed assets. The 
liquidity ratios (general liquidity ratio – lr and current ratio – cr), as well as the profitability 
ratios (Return on Equity – roe and Return on Assets – roa) are extracted from AMADEUS 
database, while the capitalization ratio (cap) is equivalent with the capital to total assets ratio.  
Table 3 presents the results of panel unit root tests for all variables and countries. With a 
small exception (the t* test indicates the absence of stationarity for investment and 
capitalization in the case of Italy), all variables are stationary and GMM models may be tested.   
 
 
Table 3. Panel unit root tests  
 Levin–Lin–Chu   
t* 
Im–Pesaran–Shin 
W-stat 
ADF–Fisher  
Chi-square 
PP–Fisher  
Chi-square 
France 
inv -178.48*** -26.687*** 1283.5*** 1832.4*** 
cap -59.872*** -4.8567*** 826.21*** 1139.2*** 
lr -29.625*** -4.2284*** 938.34*** 1266.6*** 
cr -136.49*** -8.8148*** 875.02*** 1255.3*** 
roe -95.209*** -13.785*** 1162.3*** 1672.9*** 
roa -93.703*** -14.462*** 1112.0*** 1577.2*** 
Italy 
inv -10523*** -3696.9*** 1830.4*** 1708.2*** 
cap -633.61*** -40.561*** 860.73*** 1455.6*** 
lr -34.530*** -3.5804*** 871.94*** 1191.2*** 
cr -25.908*** -2.1644** 872.10*** 1042.6*** 
roe -55.071*** -11.468*** 1051.9*** 1635.9*** 
roa -43.487*** -8.1827*** 971.91*** 1396.2*** 
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Spain 
inv 504.00 -33.357*** 1882.1*** 2807.2*** 
cap 0.2664 -11.625*** 1053.3*** 1270.6*** 
lr -38.522*** -3.9996*** 1179.6*** 1581.3*** 
cr -33.441*** -3.9028*** 1226.2*** 1498.1*** 
roe -254.89*** -19.882*** 1409.3*** 2367.1*** 
roa -214.84*** -14.507*** 1327.7*** 2044.8*** 
Notes: (i) *, **, ***, mean stationarity significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %; (ii) For all the tests, the null 
hypothesis is that the panel contains a unit root; (iii) Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution, while the other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
Classical panel data analyses investigating the role of firms’ financial performance on 
their investment behavior usually use fixed effects models to avoid the omitted variables bias. 
Therefore, along with previous studies, we draw first on a panel fixed effects model (Eq. 1).  
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (1) 
where: Yit is the dependent variable (inv); α0 is the intercept; 𝛽i represents all the stable 
characteristics of firms from each country; Xit represents the vector of independent financial 
performance variables; α 1 are the coefficients; εi,t is the error term. 
Given the fact that our sample has a N>T structure (the number of companies is much 
higher than the number of periods), we also test a random model (Eq. 2), which controls for all 
stable covariates (Allison and Waterman, 2002). To select between these two static models, a 
Hausman test is performed. 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (2) 
where: μ represents between-entity errors; εi,t are the within-entity errors. 
The results of the classic static models might be affected by an endogeneity bias. While 
the firms’ financial performance influences the investment behavior in the wine industry, we 
can also expect that an increase in investment will have a negative impact on liquidity and 
profitability in the short-run, and an opposite effect in the long-run. Further, static models do 
not account for dynamics, where changes in explicative variables influence the dependent 
variables after a time adjustment, that is, in the long-run. Therefore, we address the endogeneity 
issue applying a GMM approach. We first resort to the dynamic-GMM estimator of Arellano 
and Bond (1991): 
∆𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝜗𝑗∆𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑡−1
𝑗=𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛼1∆𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼3∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝜇𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝑢𝑖,𝑡        (3) 
where: 𝜗 is the first lag of investment dynamics; 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 are the error terms which vary 
over both firms and time; 𝛼 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
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However, for large N and small T samples, the system-GMM might have better properties 
(see Blundell and Bond, 1998), because in the case of difference-GMM estimator, lagged levels 
of regressors are considered poor instruments and ∆𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 might be still correlated with 
∆𝑢𝑖,𝑡. The system-GMM estimator implies a system of two simultaneous equations, one in level 
and one in first difference. In this case, both lagged first differences and lagged levels of 
variables act as instruments.  
Both GMM estimators might suffer from the proliferation of instruments and a Sargan 
test is used for over-identifying restrictions related to instruments. However, the Sargan test is 
not powerful enough in the presence of too many instruments. Therefore, a Hansen test statistic 
should be used if nonsphericity is suspected in the errors, which requires robust error correction 
(Roodman, 2009).  
In conclusion, the two GMM estimators we use (difference- and system-GMM) serve as 
different tools for testing the robustness of our findings. In addition, we also check the 
robustness by using a two-steps estimator instead of the default one-step. The two-steps 
estimator requires robust errors and in this case, the standard covariance matrix is robust to 
panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Further, in the two-steps approach the 
number of parameters does not grow with the number of estimated regressors in the nonlinear 
GMM step. The autocorrelation issue is checked with the Arellano–Bond tests (AR(1) and 
AR(2)) for autocorrelation, applied to differenced residuals. While the AR(1) process usually 
rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, the AR(2) test is more important as it helps 
detecting the autocorrelation in levels. 
 
4. Empirical findings 
 
This section presents the results obtained for each country retained into analysis. The 
findings of static estimators are presented in Appendix A and serve as reference for potential 
comparisons with similar researches. According to the fixed and random effects models, there 
is no significant influence of firms’ financial performance on their investment behavior in the 
case of France and Italy. However, the capitalization and liquidity negatively affect the 
investment dynamics in Spain, while the profitability level has an opposite effect.  
In what follows, we focus on the dynamic estimators’ results, and we present the 
empirical findings for each country. For each estimator, four different models are tested 
(Models 1-4), resulting from an alternative use of liquidity ratios (lr and cr) and profitability 
ratios (roe and roa). While liquidity and profitability are considered endogenous variables, the 
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capitalization ratio is included in estimations strictly as exogenous variable. There is no 
theoretical intuition that shows a direct increase or decrease in the level of capitalization, 
following an increase in the level of investment.   
 
4.1. Results for France 
In the case of France, the first set of estimations (one-step results) shows in general robust 
findings between difference- and system-GMM estimators (Table 4). As expected, in all the 
cases the capitalization level negatively influences the investment dynamics. This result states 
that an increase of the capitalization ratio might be made in the detriment of an increase in 
investments. While the liquidity is not important for the investment dynamics, the profitability 
has a positive influence, as expected. However, this last result is influenced by the way the 
profitability is measured, a significant influence being reported only in the case of roe.  
 
Table 4. GMM results for France (one-step results, GMM errors) 
 difference-GMM system-GMM  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
c  20.31***  20.49***  21.49***  21.73***  14.26***  14.24***  16.16***  16.05*** 
lag(1)  0.000*  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.001*  0.000  0.001*  0.000 
cap -2.462*** -2.268*** -2.447*** -2.254*** -1.846*** -1.692*** -1.884*** -1.731*** 
lr -0.533 -0.364   -0.138 -0.284   
cr    -0.725 -0.659   -0.687 -0.730 
roe 0.666***    0.671***   1.174***   1.196***  
roa   0.539   0.556   2.205***   2.261*** 
observations 1,986 2,317 
groups 331 331 
instruments 94 59 
Sargan over-
identification 
721.4 
[0.00] 
724.3 
[0.00] 
719.8 
[0.00] 
722.5 
[0.00] 
885.4 
[0.00] 
896.9 
[0.00] 
886.4 
[0.00] 
898.5 
[0.00] 
Notes: (i) lag(1) is the first lag of the dependent variable; (ii) capitalization is considered strictly exogenous while liquidity 
and profitability are endogenous variables; (iii) *, **, *** means significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %; (iv) inv – investment 
dynamics, cap – capitalization ratio, lr – liquidity ratio, cr – current ratio, roe – return on equity, roa – return on assets. 
 
The Sargan test shows, nevertheless, that these findings might be affected by the 
proliferation of instruments. Therefore, in the second part we have performed a two-steps 
estimation, where the number of maximum lags for the dependent variable is set at one and for 
the explanatory variable at two. In this case, the results do not indicate a significant influence 
of financial performances on the investment dynamics (Table 5). The findings are similar for 
both estimators and for all the models, and in agreement with the static analysis (Appendix A). 
Moreover, in this case, the Arellano–Bond tests show no autocorrelation problem, while the 
Sargan and Hansen tests indicate that the instruments are well identified.  
We thus conclude that in the case of France, the capitalization negatively impacts the 
investment dynamics, while the profitability has a positive impact. The liquidity has no 
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significant influence on investment. However, these findings might be influenced by the over-
identification of instruments and are not confirmed by the two-steps estimation, which puts into 
question their robustness. 
 
Table 5. GMM results for France (two-steps results, robust errors) 
 difference-GMM system-GMM  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
c  12.48  11.55  13.52*  12.56  3.621  1.520  7.926  6.261 
lag(1)  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.073  0.073  0.031  0.037 
cap -2.123 -1.747 -2.113 -1.729 -0.015 -0.002 -0. 026 -0.021 
lr -0.397 -0.203   -2.430 -1.722   
cr   -0.550 -0.453   -1.593 -1.564 
roe  0.654   0.668   0.237   -0.007  
roa   0.536   0.603   0.880   0.456 
observations 1,986 2,317 
groups 331 331 
instruments 94 32 
Arellano-Bond 
test AR(1) 
-1.339 
[0.18] 
-1.325 
[0.18] 
-1.340 
[0.18] 
-1.326 
[0.18] 
-1.320 
[0.18] 
-1.360 
[0.17] 
-1.330 
[0.18] 
-1.350 
[0.17] 
Arellano-Bond 
test AR(2) 
-0.447 
[0.65] 
-0.143 
[0.88] 
-0.474 
[0.63] 
-0.169 
[0.86] 
0.310 
[0.75] 
0.460 
[0.64] 
-0.020 
[0.98] 
0.080 
[0.93] 
Sargan over-
identification     
7.170 
[1.00] 
10.29 
[0.99] 
19.70 
[0.84] 
18.40 
[0.89] 
Hansen over-
identification     
27.62 
[0.43] 
24.52 
[0.60] 
22.66 
[0.70] 
21.74 
[0.75] 
Notes: Similar to Table 4. 
 
4.2. Results for Italy 
In the case of the Italian wine industry, the default one-step estimation shows no 
significant influence of financial performance on investment dynamics, except for the liquidity 
ratios for the system-GMM approach. Table 6 shows no significant impact of capitalization and 
profitability, while the Sargan over-identification test indicates a proliferation of instruments 
issue. 
 
Table 6. GMM results for Italy (one-step result, GMM errors) 
 difference-GMM system-GMM  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
c  24.24***  27.19***  16.26**  23.48***  7.021  9.288 -1.830  1.887 
lag(1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
cap -0.127 -0.177  0.075 -0.034 -0.076 -0.126  0.087  0.005 
lr -3.858 -5.958    12.71***  10.25***    
cr    1.709 -1.953 -0.044  12.23***  9.779*** 
roe -0.006   0.013    -0.031  
roa  -0.617  -0.399   0.655   1.149 
observations 2,010 2,345 
groups 335 335 
instruments 94 59 
Sargan over-
identification 
615.7 
[0.00] 
635.3 
[0.00] 
489.0 
[0.00] 
546.9 
[0.00] 
741.1 
[0.00] 
777.7 
[0.00] 
601.7 
[0.00] 
671.5 
[0.00] 
Notes: Similar to Table 4. 
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These findings are this time confirmed by the two-steps estimations with robust errors 
and we notice once again the lack of a significant influence of firms’ financial performance on 
their investment dynamics in Italy (Table 7). As in the case of France, the two-steps estimations 
for Italy do not present autocorrelation or over-identification problems.  
 
Table 7. GMM results for Italy (two-step results, robust errors) 
 difference-GMM system-GMM  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
c  13.29***  15.69***  6.902  13.04***  12.98***  13.70***  12.89***  13.60 
lag(1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  0.016  0.003  0.033*  0.007 
cap -0.099 -0.111  0.083 -0.027 -0.086 -0.105 -0.089 -0.081 
lr -3.952 -6.044**   -1.548 -1.127   
cr    1.675 -1.969   -0.956 -0.738 
roe -0.006   0.008   0.026   0.057  
roa  -0.745  -0.491  -0.199  -0.115 
observations 2,010 2,345 
groups 335 335 
instruments 94 59 
Arellano-Bond 
test AR(1) 
-1.716 
[0.08] 
-1.715 
[0.08] 
-1.717 
[0.08] 
-1.716 
[0.08] 
-1.750 
[0.08] 
-1.720 
[0.08] 
-1.750 
[0.08] 
-1.720 
[0.08] 
Arellano-Bond 
test AR(2) 
0.321 
[0.74] 
0.161 
[0.87] 
0.686 
[0.49] 
0.454 
[0.64] 
0.850 
[0.39] 
0.610 
[0.54] 
1.150 
[0.25] 
0.730 
[0.46] 
Sargan over-
identification     
3.260 
[1.00] 
4.280 
[1.00] 
2.580 
[1.00] 
3.690 
[1.00] 
Hansen over-
identification     
30.99 
[0.27] 
27.55 
[0.43] 
31.32 
[0.25] 
29.78 
[0.32] 
Notes: Similar to Table 4. 
 
4.3. Results for Spain 
The first set of results recorded for Spain (Table 8) shows that, in the case of a one-step 
classical estimation, the capitalization ratio has a significant and negative impact on investment 
for all tested models, while the profitability has a positive impact, regardless the way 
profitability is computed. For firms acting in Spain, we notice that liquidity negatively 
influences the investment behavior. That is, firms that decide to increase their liquidity accept 
a reduction in the investment growth rate and conversely, the increase of investment is made in 
the detriment of the liquidity level. This result can be explained by the fact that Spanish wine 
companies might use their own funds with predilection, to finance the investment opportunities. 
The two-steps estimation partially confirms the one-step findings, although the 
significance of results decreases (Table 9). For the difference-GMM estimator, for all the 
models, we notice a negative impact of capitalization and liquidity, and a positive influence of 
profitability on the investment dynamics. However, for the system-GMM estimator, the 
significance of liquidity and profitability’s coefficients is no longer recorded. 
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Table 8. GMM results for Spain (one-step results, GMM errors) 
 difference-GMM system-GMM  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
c  14.02***  12.51***  14.79***  13.26***  16.10***  15.35***  16.69***  15.91*** 
lag(1)  0.052**  0.054***  0.050***  0.052***  0.023  0.020  0.023  0.020 
cap -0.236** -0.193* -0.217** -0.174* -0.336*** -0.320*** -0.319*** -0.303*** 
lr -1.580*** -1.565***   -0.940*** -0.912***   
cr   -1.137*** -1.128***   -0.770*** -0.752*** 
roe  0.067*   0.067*   0.075**   0.075**  
roa   0.325   0.326   0.400*   0.411* 
observations 2,652 3,094 
groups 442 442 
instruments 94 59 
Sargan over-
identification 
215.7 
[0.00] 
202.0 
[0.00] 
211.2 
[0.00] 
199.8 
[0.00] 
190.0 
[0.00] 
228.2 
[0.00] 
185.8 
[0.00] 
222.9 
[0.00] 
Notes: Similar to Table 4. 
 
If in the case of the one-step estimators the Sargan test indicates an instrument over-
identification problem, in the case of the two-steps estimators (Table 9), the Sargan and Hansen 
tests show that instruments are well identified, and the autocorrelation test shows no 
autocorrelation bias, especially for the system-GMM specification. 
 
Table 9. GMM results for Spain (two-steps results, robust errors) 
 difference-GMM system-GMM  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
c  6.610***  7.872***  8.229***  8.831***  5.624***  4.469**  5.614***  4.182** 
lag(1)  0.065***  0.065***  0.062***  0.062***  0.019 -0.095  0.009 -0.068 
cap -0.103 -0.149* -0.119* -0.140* -0.079*** -0.038 -0.077*** -0.030 
lr -1.499* -1.528*   -0.174 -0.167   
cr   -1.036** -1.062**   -0.053 -0.105 
roe  0.062**   0.057  -0.009   0.023  
roa   0.437*   0.361   0.699   0.820 
observations 2,652 3,094 
groups 442 442 
instruments 94 32 
Arellano-Bond 
test AR(1) 
-3.171 
[0.00] 
-3.179 
[0.00] 
-3.153 
[0.00] 
-3.165 
[0.00] 
-2.080 
[0.03] 
-2.100 
[0.03] 
-2.250 
[0.02] 
-2.440 
[0.01] 
Arellano-Bond 
test AR(2) 
1.687 
[0.09] 
1.628 
[0.10] 
1.550 
[0.12] 
1.515 
[0.12] 
0.210 
[0.83] 
-0.059 
[0.55] 
0.170 
[0.86] 
-0.470 
[0.64] 
Sargan over-
identification     
55.01 
[0.00] 
59.66 
[0.00] 
46.77 
[0.02] 
52.48 
[0.00] 
Hansen over-
identification     
19.92 
[0.83] 
26.70 
[0.48] 
21.57 
[0.75] 
28.62 
[0.38] 
Notes: Similar to Table 4. 
 
5. Summary of results, comparisons and policy implications 
 
This section presents a short overview of the empirical findings in a comparative manner 
and discusses different financial management strategies that seems to be implemented by the 
firms acting in the wine industry from the largest worldwide producers. Table 10 shows that 
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our empirical findings are in general robust to different estimators and models we have used 
but are sensitive to the way we address the proliferation of instrument issue. 
 
Table 10. Results’ centralization 
investment dynamics difference-GMM system-GMM 
 one-step two-steps one-step two-steps 
France 
capitalization N - N - 
liquidity - - - - 
profitability P - P - 
Italy 
capitalization - - - - 
liquidity - - P - 
profitability - - - - 
Spain 
capitalization N N N N 
liquidity N N N - 
profitability P P P - 
Notes: (i) ‘P / N’ means positive / negative significant influence; (ii) ‘-‘ indicates no significant influence. 
 
We can notice that, in the case of Italy, the financial performance of wine industry 
companies does not influence their investment behavior. That is, the investment decision is 
based on other factors (e.g. market conditions), and we may suppose these companies extend 
their production capacity by accessing external funds, in the detriment of internal sources. This 
result might also indicate a lack of inertia regarding the investment dynamics in the aftermath 
of the recent global financial crisis.   
For the French wine companies, the degree of capitalization and the level of profitability 
represent reliable factors which influence their investment dynamics. In general, the 
profitability favors the investment decision, while a trade-off is recorded between investment 
and capitalization. It appears that internal funds play their role in the investment behavior, 
although the results in case of France are not very robust. 
In the case of Spanish wine companies, we notice an important role of financial 
performance in influencing their investment behavior. On the one hand, the capitalization and 
liquidity ratios have a negative influence on the investment dynamics. On the other hand, a 
higher profitability represents a prerequisite for increasing the investment level. These findings 
are quite robust and show that Spanish managers from the wine industry prefer the internal 
funds to extend their business. The results reported for Spain indicate the existence of a trade-
off between capitalization and liquidity on the one hand, and investment dynamics on the other 
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hand. Moreover, these results confirm the potential trade-off between liquidity and profitability 
underlined by previous researches. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate how firms’ investment behavior is influenced 
by their financial performance. With a focus on the wine industry from the largest EU producers 
namely France, Italy and Spain, we use firm-level data for a large set of companies to perform 
this investigation. Our panel data analysis covers the post-crisis period (2007 to 2014) and relies 
on dynamic model specifications. 
The findings show different investment strategies for firms located in these countries. It 
appears that the investment behavior of Italian firms is not influenced by their financial 
performance. In addition, in the case of French companies, only the capitalization and the 
profitability ratio are important for the investment decision, while the influence of liquidity is 
insignificant. However, these results are partially robust and might be affected by the over-
identification of the instruments used in the analysis. Finally, interesting and robust results are 
reported for Spanish firms. We show that the financial performance of wine companies is very 
important for their investment behavior. If a negative impact is recorded in the case of 
capitalization and liquidity, a positive influence is noticed for the profitability level. This means 
that the profits are usually re-invested by Spanish companies, and that internal funds are 
preferred by managers to sustain their investment decision. These findings support the growing 
importance of the Spanish wine industry at global level and have noteworthy policy 
implications for financial managers acting in these companies, as well as for the national 
authorities interested in the development and increased performance of the wine sector. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A. Static panel data analysis 
 
Table A1. Results of fixed and random effect estimators for France 
France Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Models 
Variables 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
c  109.0 
(106) 
 107.4 
(68.73) 
 92.32 
(108) 
 82.41 
(69.39) 
 107.6 
(108) 
 118.8 
(71.34) 
 90.37 
(111) 
 93.06 
(72.18) 
cap -2.158 
(13.49) 
-0.579 
(4.287) 
-4.123 
(13.45) 
-0.338 
(4.290) 
-2.173 
(13.49) 
-0.535 
(4.277) 
-4.155 
(13.44) 
-0.298 
(4.281) 
lr -1.639 
(37.71) 
-10.06 
(26.49) 
-3.861 
(37.77) 
-9.031 
(26.52) 
    
cr     -0.315 
(20.69) 
-9.197 
(15.33) 
-1.157 
(20.71) 
-8.406 
(15.34) 
roe -7.237 
(4.716) 
-6.188* 
(3.473) 
  -7.242 
(4.714) 
-6.220* 
(3.473) 
  
 
 
roa    1.431 
(16.96) 
-1.416 
(10.89) 
   1.374 
(16.95) 
-1.520 
(72.18) 
Hausman test 
(recommended) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.97 
(Random) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.98 
(Random) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.91 
(Random) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.93 
(Random) 
Notes: (i) *, **, *** means significance at 10 %, 5 % et 1 %; (ii) Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
 
 
Table A2. Results of fixed and random effect estimators for Italy 
Italy Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Models 
Variables 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
c  71.71 
(45.56) 
 45.86 
(35.54) 
 73.77 
(46.70) 
 47.18 
(35.85) 
 73.94 
(52.33) 
 49.99 
(38.61) 
 75.99 
(53.30) 
 50.82 
(38.83) 
cap -0.388 
(3.452) 
-0.829 
(2.458) 
-0.364 
(3.454) 
-0.839 
(2.458) 
-0.387 
(3.453) 
-0.867 
(2.463) 
-0.363 
(3.455) 
-0.873 
(2.463) 
lr -21.44 
(27.28) 
 6.393 
(12.51) 
-21.40 
(27.28) 
 7.107 
(12.74) 
    
cr     -14.15 
(22.06) 
 1.522 
(11.21) 
-14.12 
(22.06) 
 1.885 
(11.34) 
roe  0.000 
(1.043) 
 0.036 
(0.734) 
   0.009 
(1.043) 
 0.042 
(0.734) 
  
 
 
roa   -2.483 
(12.28) 
-2.221 
(7.782) 
  -2.491 
(12.28) 
-1.583 
(7.730) 
Hausman test 
(recommended) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.71 
(Random) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.69 
(Random) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.86 
(Random) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.85 
(Random) 
Notes: (i) *, **, *** means significance at 10 %, 5 % et 1 %; (ii) Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
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Table A3. Results of fixed and random effect estimators for Spain 
Spain Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Models 
Variables 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
c  14.50*** 
(2.338) 
 9.399*** 
(35.54) 
 13.82*** 
(2.364) 
 8.747*** 
(1.116) 
 15.17*** 
(2.367) 
 9.845*** 
(1.103) 
 14.49*** 
(2.392) 
 9.176*** 
(38.83) 
cap -0.241*** 
(0.770) 
-0.092*** 
(0.025) 
-0.225*** 
(0.077) 
-0.075*** 
(0.026) 
-0.231*** 
(0.077) 
-0.086*** 
(0.025) 
-0.214*** 
(0.077) 
-0.068** 
(0.026) 
lr -0.629** 
(0.270) 
-0.095 
(0.189) 
-0.631** 
(0.270) 
-0.123 
(0.189) 
    
cr     -0.597*** 
(0.206) 
-0.234 
(0.144) 
-0.599*** 
(0.206) 
-0.253* 
(0.144) 
roe  0.052* 
(0.029) 
 0.044* 
(0.026) 
   0.052* 
0.029) 
 0.045* 
(0.026) 
  
 
 
roa    0.286 
(0.180) 
 0.352** 
(0.139) 
   0.291 
(0.179) 
 0.355** 
(0.139) 
Hausman test 
(recommend) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
(Fixed) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.01 
(Fixed) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.01 
(Fixed) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.01 
(Fixed) 
Notes: (i) *, **, *** means significance at 10 %, 5 % et 1 %; (ii) Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
 
 
